Thanks AF, but I actually contributed to that part...

2006-09-28T23:15:00.000+10:00

Thanks AF, but I actually contributed to that particular bit of the wikipedia entry, (based on my honours thesis - hence the similarity) so it's kind of circular to use that as a reference.

Cole, I thought the two citations I give from Enquiry and Treatise do exactly that? (I won't bother repeating them in their entirety.)

What else do I make of this sentence other than his disbelief of causation? "We only observe the thing itself, and always find that from the constant conjunction the objects acquire an union in the imagination."

A union in the imagination?

To be clear, by causation I go with Salmon's definition, a real physical connection between cause and effect. Hume explicitly rejects this.

You state: "And the causal necessity we attribute to a cause-effect relation is a psychological projection of an internal feeling, akin to colors and sounds."

To me a "psychological projection of an internal feeling" is an explicit rejection of a real physical connection.

A lot of this stems from the problem of induction, which itself stems from philosophers wanting/needing logical proofs as the basis for their epistemology, as opposed to a sound rational foundation. As you'll see in the wikipedia link, that's Hume's fault too. Though to be fair, he did make the distinction between logical and rational (in other terms however).

Here's a bit of Bertrand Russell's section on Hume in History of Western Philosophy (highly recommended to all):

Let us now ask ourselves what we are to think of Hume's doctrine. It has two parts, one objective, the other subjective. The objective part says: When we judge that A causes B, what has in fact happened, so far as A and B are concerned, is that they have been constantly conjoined, i.e. A has been immediately, or very quickly, followed by B; we have no right to say that A must be followed by B, or will be followed by B on future occasions. Nor have we any ground for supposing that, however often A is followed by B, any relation beyond the sequence is involved. In fact, causation is definable in terms of sequence, and is not an independent notion.

The subjective part of the doctrine says: The frequently observed conjunction of A and B causes the impression of A to cause the idea of B. But if we are to define 'cause' as is suggested in the objective part of the doctrine, we must reword the above. Substituting the definition of 'cause', the above becomes:

'It has been frequently observed that the frequently observed conjunction of two objects A and B has been frequently followed by occasions on which the impression of A was followed by the idea of B.'

This statement, we may admit, is true, but it is hardly the scope that Hume attributes to the subjective part of his doctrine. He contends, over and over again, that the frequent conjunction of A and B gives no reason for expecting them to be conjoined in the future, but is merely a cause of this expectation.

Russell further clarifies the objective part of Hume's doctrine:

This doctrine has two parts: (1) When we say 'A causes B', all that we have a right to say is that, in past experience, A and B have frequently appeared together or in rapid succession, and no instance has been observed of A not followed by or accompanied by B. (2) However many instances we may have observed of the conjunction of A and B, that gives no reason for expecting them to conjoined on a future occasion, though it is a cause of this expectation, i.e., it has been frequently observed to be conjoined with such an expectation. These two parts of the doctrine may be stated as follows: (1) in causation there is no indefinable relation except conjunction or succession; (2) induction by simple enumeration is not a valid argument.

I think I'll add all the above Bertrand Russell to the wikipedia entry.

As Russell points out, essentially Hume is making the correct point, that causation is not a logical necessity. Of course, this leads to a slight problem. Anytime someone says A caused B, by Hume's logic they are making the Correlation-Causation error. This all comes back to the difference between deductive and inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning is always true (assuming one does it correctly), because the premises are accepted a priori. Inductive reasoning is not possible to "prove" in the same way. This in itself comes back to the difference between logical reasoning and rational reasoning. I wrote about this in Philosophy Now a few years back, so I'll post that essay in the near future.

I think what you say about Hume is very wrong: tha...

2006-09-26T12:41:00.000+10:00

I think what you say about Hume is very wrong: that he "didn’t believe in cause and effect", that he "argued that we are actually mistaken in our belief about cause and effect". He just thought that causal reasoning was done on the basis of psychological associations, rather than a priori reasoning or intellectual reasoning from experience. The view you're attributing to Hume is, I think, nowhere to be found in the Treatise or 1st Enquiry.

Off the top of my head (so errors may show up): First, Hume argued that we don't (and can't) learn about what causes what through abstract reasonings a priori (for Hume, "intuition" and "demonstration"). This is because any distinct things can easily be conceived apart from each other, and demonstrations/intuitions always close off alternate conceivability. So, he argued, we learn about what causes what through reasoning based on experience. What kind of reasoning? Well, intellectual reasoning would rely on the principle that the future resembles the past. But this principle cannot be demonstrated/intuited (we can easily conceive the contrary) and it obviously cannot be arrived at by causal reasoning (since that's what we're trying to explain). So instead our causal reasoning is based on experience in another, non-intellectual way: experienced conjunctions of things gradually train the mind to expect one when it sees the other. And the causal necessity we attribute to a cause-effect relation is a psychological projection of an internal feeling, akin to colors and sounds.

It's a psychological story about causal reasoning. That's why he talks about children and animals.

Comments on The Skeptic's Field Guide: Hume's [expletive] happens skepticism

Thanks AF, but I actually contributed to that part...

Maybe you'll believe wikipedia Cole?

2006-09-28T17:04:00.000+10:00
Maybe you'll believe wikipedia Cole?

Hume and Causation.

I think what you say about Hume is very wrong: tha...

Comments on The Skeptic's Field Guide: Hume's [expletive] happens skepticism

Thanks AF, but I actually contributed to that part...

Maybe you'll believe wikipedia Cole? 2006-09-28T17:04:00.000+10:00 Maybe you'll believe wikipedia Cole?Hume and Causation.

I think what you say about Hume is very wrong: tha...

Maybe you'll believe wikipedia Cole?

2006-09-28T17:04:00.000+10:00
Maybe you'll believe wikipedia Cole?

Hume and Causation.